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Abstract
We show a regret minimization algorithm for setting the re-
serve price in second-price auctions. We make the assump-
tion that all bidders draw their bids from the same unknown
and arbitrary distribution. Our algorithm is computation-
ally ecient, and achieves a regret of e O(
p
T), even when the
number of bidders is stochastic with a known distribution.
1 Introduction.
Consider a merchant selling items through e-Bay auc-
tions. The sell price in each auction is the second-
highest bid, and the merchant knows the price at which
the item was sold, but not the individual bids from the
bidders that participated in the auction. How can the
merchant set a reserve price in order to optimize rev-
enues? Similarly, consider a publisher selling advertise-
ment space through AdX or Adsense, where advertis-
ers bid for the advertisement slot and the price is the
second-highest bid. With no access to the number of
bidders that participate in the auction, and knowing
only the actual price that was charged, how can the
publisher set an optimal reserve price?
We abstract this scenario by considering the follow-
ing problem: A seller is faced with repeated auctions,
where each auction has a (dierent) set of bidders, and
each bidder draws bids from some xed unknown dis-
tribution which is the same for all bidders. Notice that
we need not assume that the bidders indeed bid their
value. Our assumption on the bidders symmetry, a pri-
ori, implies that if they bid using the same strategy,
their bid distribution is identical.1 The sell price is the
second-highest bid, and the seller's goal is to maximize
the revenue by only relying on information regarding
revenues on past auctions.
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1For example, if we had considered a rst price auction, then
assuming that bidders use the same strategy to map their private
value to a bid would result in the same bid distribution.
The issue of revenue maximization in second-price
auctions has received a signicant attention in the eco-
nomics literature. The Revenue Equivalence theorem
shows that truthful mechanisms that allocate identically
have identical revenue (see [15]). Myerson [14], for the
case of monotone hazard rate distributions, character-
ized the optimal revenue maximization truthful mech-
anism as a second-price auction with a seller's reserve
price. Yet, in addition to their theoretical relevance, re-
serve prices are to a large extent the main mechanism
through which a seller can directly inuence the auction
revenue in today's electronic markets. The examples of
e-Bay, AdX and Adsense are just a few in a large collec-
tion of such settings. The practical signicance of opti-
mizing reserve prices in sponsored search was reported
in [16], where optimization produced a strong impact
on Yahoo!'s revenue.
We stress that unlike much of the mechanism design
literature, we are not searching for the optimal revenue
maximization truthful mechanism. Rather, our goal
is to maximize the seller's revenue in a given, yet
very popular, mechanism of second-price auction with
a reserve price. In our model, the seller has only
information about the auction price (and possibly about
the number of bidders that participated in the auction).
We assume all buyers have the same unknown bid
distribution, but we make no assumptions about this
distribution, only that the bids are from a bounded
domain. In particular, we do not assume that the
distribution has a monotone hazard rate, a traditional
assumption in the economics literature. The main
modeling assumption we rely upon is that buyers draw
their value independently from the same distribution
(i.e., bids are independent and identically distributed).
This is a reasonable assumption when the auction is
open to a wide audience of potential buyers. In this
case, it is plausible that the seller's strategy of choosing
reserve prices has no inuence on the distribution of
bids.
1.1 Our results. The focus of our work is on setting
the reserve price in a second-price auction, in order
to maximize the seller's revenue. Our main result is
an online algorithm that optimizes the seller's reserve
price based only on the observation of the seller's actualrevenue at each step. We show that after T steps (T
repetitions of the auction) our algorithm has a regret of
only e O(
p
T). Namely, using our online algorithm the
seller has an average revenue per auction that diers
from that of the optimal reserve price by at most
e O(1=
p
T), assuming the bids are in the range [0;1].
Our algorithm is rather easy to explain and moti-
vate at a high level. Let us start with a simple O(T2=3)
regret algorithm, similar to [12]. The algorithm dis-
cretizes the range of reserve prices to (T1=3) price bins,
and uses some ecient bandit algorithm over the bins.
It is easy to see that lowering the optimal reserve price
by  will result in an average loss2 of at most . This al-
ready shows that vanishing average regret is achievable,
specically, a regret of O(T2=3). Our main objective
is to improve over this basic algorithm and achieve a
regret of e O(
p
T).
An important observation to understand our algo-
rithm is that by setting the reserve price low (say, zero)
we observe the second-highest bid, since this will be the
price in the auction. With enough observations we can
reconstruct the distribution of the second-highest bid.
Given the assumption that the bidders' bid distributions
are identical, we can recover the bid distribution of an
individual bidder, and the distribution of the highest
bid. Clearly, a good approximation to this distribu-
tion results in a good approximation to the optimal re-
serve price. Unfortunately, this simple method does not
improve the regret, since a good approximation of the
second-highest bid distribution incurs a signicant loss
in the exploration and results in a regret of O(T2=3),
similar to the regret of the discretization approach.
Our main solution is to perform only a rough
estimate of the second-highest bid distribution. Using
this rough estimate, we can set a better reserve price.
In order to facilitate future exploration, it is important
to set the new reserve price to the lowest potentially
optimal reserve price. The main benet is that our
new reserve price has a lower regret to the revenue
of the optimal reserve price, and we can bound this
improved regret. We continue in this process, getting
improved approximations to the optimal reserve price,
and accumulating lower regret (per time step) in each
successive iteration, resulting in a total regret of e O(
p
T)
for T time steps.
Our ability to reconstruct the bid distribution de-
pends on our knowledge about the number of participat-
ing bidders in the auction. Our simpler case involves a
known number of bidders (Section 2). We later extend
2Note that the setting is not symmetric, and increasing by
 might lower the revenue signicantly, by disqualifying many
attractive bids.
the algorithm and analysis to the case where there is
stochasticity in the number of bidders through a known
distribution (Section 3). In both cases we prove a re-
gret bound of e O(
p
T). This bound is optimal up to
logarithmic factors. In fact, simple choices of the bid
distribution exist that force any algorithm to have or-
der of
p
T regret, even when there are only two bidders
whose bids are revealed to the algorithm at the end of
each auction.
1.2 Related work. There is a vast literature in
Algorithmic Game Theory on the topic of second price
auction with sponsored search as a motivation. An
important thread of research concerns the design of
truthful mechanisms to maximize the revenue in the
worst case, and the derivation of competitive ratio
bounds, see [10]. A recent related work [8] discusses
revenue maximization in a Bayesian setting. Their
main result is a mechanism that achieves a constant
approximation ratio w.r.t. any prior distribution using
a single sample. They also show that with additional
samples, the approximation ratio improves, and in
some settings they even achieve a 1    approximation.
In contrast, we assume a xed but unknown prior
distribution, and consider the rate at which we can
approximate the optimal reserve price. In our setting, as
we mentioned before, achieving a 1    approximation,
even for  = T 1=3, is straightforward, and the main
focus of this paper is to show that a rate of  = T 1=2
is attainable.
Item pricing, which is related to regret minimization
under partial observation [5], has also received signi-
cant attention. A specic related work is [12], where the
eect of knowing the demand curve is studied. (The de-
mand curve is equivalent to the bid distribution.) The
mechanism discussed in [12] is a posted price mechanism,
and the regret is computed in both stochastic and ad-
versarial settings. In the stochastic setting they assume
that the expected revenue function is strictly concave,
and use the UCB algorithm of [3] over discretized bid
values to derive their strategy. Again, we do not make
such assumptions in our work.
The question of the identication of the buyers'
utilities given the auction outcome has been studied
in the economics literature. The main goal is to
recover in the limit the buyers' private value distribution
(i.e., the buyers' utility function), given access to the
resulting auction price (i.e., the auction outcome) and
assuming that bidders utilities are independent and
identically distributed [9, 1]. It is well known in the
economics literature that given a bid distribution that
has a monotone hazard rate, there is a unique reserve
price maximizing the expected revenue in a second-priceauction, and this optimal price is independent of the
number of bidders. As we do not make the monotone
hazard rate assumption, in our case the optimal price
for each auction might depend on the actual (varying)
number of bidders. Because the seller does not observe
the number of bidders before setting the reserve price
(Section 3), we prove our results using the regret to the
best reserve price, w.r.t. a known prior over the number
of bidders. As we just argued, depending on the bid
distribution, this best reserve price need not be the same
as the optimal reserve price one could set when knowing
the actual number of bidders in advance.
There have been some works [7, 20, 11] on optimiz-
ing the reserve price, concentrating on more involved
issues that arise in practice, such as discrete bids, non-
stationary behavior, hidden bids, and more. While we
are denitely not the rst ones to consider approximat-
ing optimal reserve prices in a second-price auction, to
the best of our knowledge this is the rst work that
derives formal and concrete convergence rates.
Finally, note that any algorithm for one-
dimensional stochastic bandit optimization could po-
tentially be applied to solve our revenue maximization
problem. Indeed, whenever a certain reserve price is
chosen, the algorithm observes a realization of the asso-
ciated stochastic revenue. While many algorithms exist
that guarantee low regret in this setting, they all rely
on specic assumptions on the function to optimize (in
our case, the expected revenue function). For exam-
ple, [6] obtains a regret of order
p
T under smoothness
and strong concavity. The authors of [2] achieve a re-
gret worse only by logarithmic factors without concav-
ity, but assuming conditions on the derivatives. The
work [21] shows a bound of the same order just assum-
ing unimodality. The work [4] also obtains the same
asymptotics e O(
p
T) on the regret using a local Lips-
chitz condition. The approach developed in this paper
avoids making any assumption on the expected revenue
function, such as Lipschitzness or bounded number of
maxima. Instead, it exploits the specic feedback model
provided by the second-price auction in order gain in-
formation about the optimum.
2 Known number of bidders.
We rst show our results for the case where the number
of bidders m is known and xed. In Section 3 we
will remove this assumption, and extend the results
to the case when the number of bidders is a random
variable with a known distribution. Fortunately, most
of the ideas of the algorithm can be explained and nicely
analyzed in the simpler case.
2.1 Preliminaries. The auctioneer collects m 
2 bids B1;B2;:::;Bm which are i.i.d. bounded ran-
dom variables (for deniteness, we let Bi 2 [0;1]
for i = 1;:::;m) whose common cumulative distri-
bution function F is arbitrary and unknown. We
let B(1);B(2);:::;B(m) denote the corresponding order
statistics B(1)  B(2)    B(m).
In this simplied setting, we consider a protocol in
which a learning algorithm (or a \mechanism") is set-
ting a reserve price p 2 [0;1] for the auction. The algo-
rithm then observes a revenue R(p) = R(p; B1;:::;Bm)
dened as follows:
R(p) =
8
> <
> :
B(2) if p  B(2)
p if B(2) < p  B(1)
0 if p > B(1) :
In words, if the reserve price p is higher than the highest
bid B(1), the item is not sold, and the auctioneer's
revenue is zero; if p is lower than B(1) but higher than
the second-highest bid B(2) then we sell at the reserve
price p (i.e., the revenue is p); nally, if p is lower
than B(2) we sell the item to the bidder who issued
the highest bid B(1) at the price of the second-highest
bid B(2) (hence the revenue is B(2)).
The expected revenue (p) = E[R(p)] is the ex-
pected value of the revenue gathered by the auctioneer
when the algorithm plays price p, the expectation being
over the bids B1;B2;:::Bm. Let
p = argmax
p2[0;1]
(p)
be the optimal price for the bid distribution F. We also
write F2 to denote the cumulative distribution function
of B(2). We can write the expected revenue as
(p) = E

B(2)
+ E

p   B(2)
B(2) < p  B(1)
P

B(2) < p  B(1)
  E

B(2) p > B(1)
P

p > B(1)
where the rst term is the baseline, the revenue of a
second-price auction with no reserve price. The second
term is the gain due to the reserve price (increasing
the revenue beyond the second-highest bid). The third
term is the loss due to the possibility that we will not
sell (when the reserve price is higher than the highest
bid). The following fact streamlines the computation of
(p). All proofs are given in the appendices.
Fact 2.1. With the notation introduced so far, we have
(p) = E

B(2)
+
Z p
0
F2(t)dt   p(F(p))m :
where the expectation E[] is over the m bids
B1;B2;:::;Bm.The algorithm interacts with its environment (the bid-
ders) in a sequential fashion. At each time step t =
1;2;::: the algorithm sets a price pt and receives rev-
enue Rt(pt) = R(pt ; Bt;1;:::;Bt;m) which is a function
of the random bids Bt;1;:::;Bt;m at time t. The price pt
depends on past revenues Rs(ps) for s < t, and there-
fore on past bids. Given a sequence of reserve prices
p1;:::;pT, we dene the (cumulative) regret as
(2.1)
T X
t=1
 
E[Rt(p)] Et[Rt(pt)]

=
T X
t=1
 
(p) (pt)

where the expectation Et = Et[ j p1;:::;pt 1] is over
the random bids at time t, conditioned on all past
prices p1;:::;pt 1 (i.e., conditioned on the past history
of the bidding process). This implies that the regret PT
t=1
 
(p)   (pt)

is indeed a random variable, as
each pt depends on the past random revenues. Our
goal is to devise an algorithm whose regret after T
steps is e O(
p
T) with high probability, and with as
few assumptions as possible on F. We see in the
sequel that, when T is large, this goal can actually
be achieved with no assumptions whatsoever on the
underlying distribution F. Moreover, in Appendix B we
use a uniform convergence argument to show that the
same regret bound e O(
p
T) holds with high probability
for the actual regret
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
 
Rt(p)   Rt(pt)

:
Note that here the actual revenue of the seller is com-
pared against the best reserve price on each sequence of
bid realizations. Therefore, this is a much harder notion
of regret than (2.1).
It is well known that from the distribution of any or-
der statistics one can reconstruct the underlying distri-
bution. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the true
distribution of order statistics, but only to an approxi-
mation thereof. We need to show that a small deviation
in our approximation will have a small eect on our -
nal result. The following preliminary lemma will be of
great importance in our approximations. It shows that
if we have a small error in the approximation of F2(p)
we can recover (p) with a small error. Note that ()
is dened there in such a way that F2(p) = ((F(p))m).
The main technical diculty arises from the fact that
the function  1() we use in reconstructing (F())m
from F2() |see pseudocode in Algorithm 1, is not a
Lipschitz function.
Lemma 2.1. Fix an integer m  2 and consider the
function
(x) = mx
m 1
m   (m   1)x; x 2 [0;1] :
Then  1() exists in [0;1]. Moreover, if a 2 (0;1) and
x 2 [0;1] are such that a     (x)  a +  for some
  0, then
(2.2)  1(a)  
2
p
1   a
 x   1(a) +
2
p
1   a
:
In a nutshell, this lemma shows how approximations in
the value of () turn into approximations in the value
of  1(). Because the derivative of  1 is innite at 1,
we cannot hope to get a good approximation unless a
is bounded away from 1. For this very reason, we need
to make sure that our function approximations are only
applied to cases where the arguments are not too close
to 1. The approximation parameter  in the pseudocode
of Algorithm 1 will serve this purpose.
2.2 The algorithm. Our algorithm works in stages,
where the same price is consistently played during each
stage. Stage 1 lasts T1 steps, during which the algorithm
plays pt = b p1 for all t = 1;:::;T1. Stage 2 lasts T2
steps, during which the algorithm plays pt = b p2 for all
t = T1 + 1;:::;T1 + T2, and so on. Overall, the regret
suered by this algorithm can be written as
S X
i=1
 
(p)   (b pi)

Ti
where the sum is over the S stages. The length Ti of
each stage will be set later on, as a function of the total
number of steps T. The reserve prices b p1; b p2;::: are
set such that 0 = b p1  b p2    1. At the end of
each stage i, the algorithm computes a new estimate
b i of the expected revenue function  in the interval
[b pi;1], where p is likely to lie. This estimate depends
on the empirical cumulative distribution function b F2;i
of F2 computed during stage i in the interval [b pi;1].
The algorithm pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1. The
quantity C;i(p) therein is dened as
C;i(p) = p
s
2
 
1   b F2;i(p)

Ti
ln
6S

:
C;i(p) is a condence interval (at condence level
1 =(3S)) for the point estimate b i(p) in stage i, where
S = S(T) is an upper bound on the total number of
stages.
Stage 1 is a seed stage where the algorithm com-
putes a rst approximation b 1 of . Since the algo-
rithm plays b p1 = 0, and R(0) = B(2), during this stage
T1 independent realizations of the second-bid variable
B(2) are observed. Hence the empirical distribution b F2;1
in Algorithm 1 is a standard cumulative empirical dis-
tribution function based on i.i.d. realizations of B(2).Algorithm 1: Regret Minimizer
Input: condence level  2 (0;1], approximation parameter  2 (0;1];
Stage 1:
 For all t = 1;:::;T1, play pt = b p1 = 0 and observe revenues R1(0);:::;RT1(0);
 Compute, for x 2 [0;1], empirical distribution
b F2;1(x) =
1
T1

 

t = 1;:::;T1 : Rt(0)  x
	
 ;
 Compute, for p 2 [0;1], approximation
b 1(p) = E

B(2)
+
Z p
0
b F2;1(t)dt   p 1 b F2;1(p)

:
For Stage i = 2;3;:::
 For all t = 1 +
Pi 1
j=1 Tj;:::;
Pi
j=1 Tj, play pt = b pi, and observe revenues R1(b pi);:::;RTi(b pi),
where b pi is computed as follows:
{ Compute maximizer
b p
i 1 = argmax
p2[b pi 1;1]: b F2;i 1(p)1 
b i 1(p) ;
{ Let Pi =
n
p 2 [b pi 1;1] : b i 1(p)  b i 1(b p
i 1)   2C;i 1(b p
i 1)   2C;i 1(p)
o
;
{ Set b pi = minPi
Tn
p : b F2;i 1(p)  1   
o
;
 Compute, for x 2 [b pi;1], empirical distribution
b F2;i(x) =
1
Ti

 
n
t = 1;:::;Ti : Rt(b pi)  x
o
 ;
 Compute, for p 2 [b pi;1], approximation
b i(p) = E

B(2)
+
Z b pi
0
F2(t)dt +
Z p
b pi
b F2;i(t)dt   p 1 b F2;i(p)

:
The approximation b 1 is based on the corresponding
expected revenue  contained in Fact 2.1, where () is
the function dened in Lemma 2.1. Note that if  1
is available, maximizing the above function (done in
Stage 2) can easily be computed from the data. The
presence of the unknown constant E

B(2)
is not a prob-
lem for this computation.3 In Stage 2 (encompassing
trials t = T1 + 1;:::;T1 + T2) the algorithm calculates
3Note that in the algorithm (subsequent Stage 2) we either
take the dierence of two values b 1(p1)   b 1(p2), in which case
the constant cancels, or maximize over b 1(p), in which case the
constant does not change the outcome.
the empirical maximizer
b p
1 = argmax
p2[0;1]: b F2;1(p)1 
b 1(p)
then computes the set of candidate optimal reserve
prices
P2 =

p 2 [0;1] : b 1(p)  b 1(b p
1) 2C;1(b p
1) 2C;1(p)
	
and sets the reserve price b p2 to be the lowest one in
P2, subject to the additional constraint that4 b F2;1(p) 
4Note that the intersection is not empty, since b p
1 is in the
intersection.1 . Price b p2 is played during all trials within Stage 2.
The corresponding revenues Rt(b p2), for t = 1;:::;T2,
are gathered and used to construct an empirical cumu-
lative distribution b F2;2 and an approximate expected
revenue function b 2 to be used only in the subinterval5
[b p2;1].
In order to see why b F2;2 and b 2 are useful only on
[b p2;1], observe that
R(b p2) =
(
b p2 or 0 if B(2) < b p2
B(2) if B(2)  b p2:
Thus, for any x  b p2 we have that
P(R(b p2)  x) = P(B(2)  x) :
Hence, if we denote by R1(b p2);:::;RT2(b p2) the revenues
observed by the algorithm during Stage 2, the empirical
distribution function
b F2;2(x) =
1
T2


t = 1;:::;T2 : Rt(b p2)  x
	

approximates F2(x) only for x 2 [b p2;1].
All other stages i > 2 proceed similarly, each stage
i relying on the existence of empirical estimates b F2;i 1,
b i 1, and b pi 1 delivered by the previous stage i   1.
2.3 Regret analysis. We start by showing that for
all stages i the term 1   b F2;i(p) in the denominator
of C;i(p) can be controlled for all p such that (p) is
bounded away from zero. Recall that S = S(T) denotes
the total number of stages.
Lemma 2.2. With the notation introduced so far, for
any xed stage i,
1   b F2;i(p) 
(p)2
6
 
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

holds with probability at least 1 =(3S), conditioned on
all past stages and uniformly over p 2 [b pi;1].
In the sequel, we use Lemma 2.2 with p = p and
assume that 1  b F2;i(p)   holds for each stage i with
probability at least 1 =(3S), where the approximation
parameter  is such that
 =
(p)2
6
 
r
1
2mini Ti
ln
6S

provided p 2 [b pi;1]. In order to ensure that  > 0,
it suces to have (p) > 0 and T large enough |
5Once again, computing the argmax of b 2 over [b p2;1] as well
as the set of candidates P3 (done in the subsequent Stage 3) is
not prevented by the presence of the unknown constants E

B(2)
and
R b p2
0 F2(t)dt therein.
see Theorem 2.1 below. Recall that it is important to
guarantee that b F2;i(p) is bounded away from 1 for all
arguments p which we happen to evaluate b F2;i at. This
is because the function  1 has an innite derivative in
1.
The following lemma is crucial to control the regret
of Algorithm 1. It states that the approximation in
stage i is accurate. In addition, it bounds the empirical
regret in stage i, provided our current reserve price is
lower than the optimal reserve price. The proof is a
probabilistic induction over stages i.
Lemma 2.3. The event
(2.3)

(p)   b i(p)

  2C;i(p) for all p 2 [b pi;1].
holds with probability at least 1   =3 simultaneously in
all stages i = 1;:::;S. Moreover, the events
(2.4)
p  b pi
0  b i(b p
i)   b i(p)  2C;i(b p
i) + 2C;i(p)
both hold with probability at least 1    simultaneously
in all stages i = 1;:::;S.
The next theorem proves our regret bound under the
assumption that (p) is nonzero. Note that (p) = 0
corresponds to the degenerate case (p) = 0 for all
p 2 [0;1]. Under the above assumption, the theorem
states that when the horizon T is suciently large,
then with high probability the regret of Algorithm 1 is
O
 p
T logloglogT(loglogT)

= e O
 p
T

. It is impor-
tant to remark that in this bound there is no explicit
dependence on the number m of bidders.
Theorem 2.1. With the notation introduced so far, for
any distribution F of the bids and any m  2 such that
(p) > 0, we have that Algorithm 1 operating on any
time horizon T such that
T >
1
(p)8

72ln
6(1 + log2 log2 T)

2
using stage lengths Ti = T1 2
 i
for i = 1;2;:::
(for simplicity, we have disregarded rounding eects in
the computation of the integer stage lengths Ti), and
approximation parameter   (p)2=12 has regret
O
 p
T(logloglogT + log1=)(loglogT)
(p)
!
= e O
 p
T log1=
(p)
!
with probability at least 1   .The proof of this theorem follows by applying at
each stage i the uniform approximation delivered by
Lemma 2.3 on the accuracy of empirical to true re-
gret. This would bound the regret in stage i by
8
q
1
Ti 1 ln 6S
 |see the proof in Appendix A. We then
set the length Ti of stage i as Ti = T1 2
 i
, which im-
plies that the total number of stages S is O(loglogT).
Finally, we sum the regret over the stages to derive the
theorem.
2.4 Lower bounds. The next theorem shows that
the
p
T dependence on the time horizon T cannot be
removed even in very special cases.
Theorem 2.2. With the notation introduced so far, for
any T large enough, there exists a distribution of the bids
such that any algorithm operating with m = 2 bidders is
forced to have regret
T X
t=1
 
(p)   (pt)

= 

 p
T

with constant probability.
The proof, which is omitted from this version of the
paper, constructs a simple family of bid distributions
that the are statistically indistinguishable unless T =


 
1=2
realizations of the bid distribution are ob-
served. Since by the maxima of the revenue functions
for the two distributions are designed to be -apart, the
regret accumulated during these T observations is of the
order of T = 

 p
T

, and the result follows.
Notice that this result is not a consequence of our
partial information setting. The above lower bound
holds even when the algorithm is aorded to observe the
actual bids at each round, rather than only the revenue.
3 Random number of bidders.
We now consider the case when the number of bidders m
in each trial is a random variable M distributed accord-
ing to a known discrete distribution Q over f2;3;4;:::g.
The assumption that Q is known is realistic: one can
think of estimating it from historical data that might
be provided by the auctioneer. On each trial, the value
M = m is randomly generated according to Q, and
the auctioneer collects m bids B1;B2;:::;Bm. For
given m, these bids are i.i.d. bounded random vari-
ables B 2 [0;1] with unknown cumulative distribution
F, which is the setting considered in Section 2. For
simplicity, we assume that M is independent of the ran-
dom variables Bi. For xed M = m, we denote by
B
(1)
m  B
(2)
m  :::  B
(m)
m the corresponding order
statistics.
Our learning algorithm is the same as before: In
each time step, the algorithm is requested to set reserve
price p 2 [0;1] and, for the given realization of M = m,
only observes the value of the revenue function Rm(p) =
R(p;B1;B2;:::;Bm) dened as
Rm(p) =
8
> <
> :
B
(2)
m if p  B
(2)
m ;
p if B
(2)
m < p  B
(1)
m ;
0 if p > B
(1)
m
without knowing the specic value of m that generated
this revenue. Namely, after playing price p the algo-
rithm is observing an independent realization of the ran-
dom variable RM(p). The expected revenue (p) is now
(p) = EME

RM(p)

=
1 X
m=2
Q(m)E

Rm(p)

M = m

the inner expectation E[ j M = m] being over the
random bids B1;B2;:::;Bm.
Again, we want to minimize the regret with respect
to the optimal reserve price
p = argmax
p2[0;1]
(p)
for the bid distribution F, averaged over the distribution
Q over the number of bidders M, where the regret over
T time steps is
T X
t=1
((p)   (pt))
and pt is the price set by the algorithm at time t. Again,
in Appendix B we show that the same regret bound
holds for the actual regret
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
 
R
Mt
t (p)   R
Mt
t (pt)

where Mt is the number of bidders at time t.
Let F2;m denote the cumulative distribution func-
tion of B
(2)
m . We use EM

F2;M

(x) to denote the mix-
ture distribution
P1
m=2 Q(m)F2;m(x). Likewise,
EM

FM
(x) =
1 X
m=2
Q(m)(F(x))m :
Relying on Fact 2.1, one can easily see that
(3.5)
(p) = EME

B
(2)
M

+
Z p
0
EM

F2;M

(t)dt
  pEM

FM
(p) :As in Section 2, our goal is to devise an online algorithm
whose regret is of the form
p
T with as few assumptions
as possible on F and Q.
We rst extend6 Lemma 2.1 to handle this more
general setting.
Lemma 3.1. Let T be the probability generating func-
tion of M,
T(x) =
1 X
m=2
Q(m)xm
and dene the auxiliary function
A(x) = T(x) + (1   x)T0(x)
where, for both functions, we let the argument x range
in [0,1]. Then T and A are bijective mappings from
[0,1] onto [0,1] and both T 1 and A 1 exist in [0,1].
Moreover, letting a 2 (0;1), and 0   < 1   a, if x is
such that
a     A(T 1(x))  a + 
then
(3.6)
T(A 1(a)) 
E[M]
1   (a + )
 x  T(A 1(a))+
E[M]
1   (a + )
:
In addition, if 7
(3.7)
(T00(x))2 (1   x) + T0(x)T00(x)  T0(x)T000(x)(1   x)
holds for all x 2 [0;1] then, for any a 2 (0;1) and   0,
(3.8) T(A 1(a))  

1   a
 x  T(A 1(a)) +

1   a
:
Observe that T() and A() in this lemma have been
dened in such a way that
EM[F2;M](p) = A(F(p))
and
EM[FM](p) = T(F(p)) :
Hence, EM[FM](p) in (3.5) satises EM[FM](p) =
T

A 1 
EM[F2;M](p)

. In particular, when P(M =
6In fact, dealing with a more general setting only allowed us
to obtained a looser result than Lemma 2.1.
7Condition (3.7) is a bit hard to interpret: It is equivalent
to the convexity of the function T(A 1(x)) for x 2 [0;1] (see
the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Appendix A), and it can be shown
to be satised by many standard parametric families of discrete
distributions Q, e.g., Uniform, Binomial, Poisson, Geometric.
There are, however, examples where this condition does not hold.
For instance, the distribution Q, where Q(2) = 0:4, Q(8) = 0:6,
and Q(m) = 0 for any m 6= 2;8 does not satisfy (3.7) for x = 0:6,
i.e., it yields a function T(A 1(x)) which is not convex on x = 0:6.
m) = 1 as in Section 2, we obtain T(x) = xm and
A(x) = mxm 1   (m   1)xm. Thus, in this case
A(T 1()) is the function () dened in Lemma 2.1, and
the reconstruction function  1() we used throughout
Section 2 is T(A 1()). Because this is a more general
setting then the one in Section 2, we do still have the
technical issue of insuring that the argument of this
recostruction function is not too close to 1.
As in the xed m case, the algorithm proceeds
in stages. In each stage i the algorithm samples the
function EM[F2;M] by sampling RM(p) at appropriate
values of p. This allows it to build an empirical
distribution b F2;i and to reconstruct the two unknown
functions EM[F2;M] and EM[FM] occurring in (3.5)
over an interval of reserve prices that is likely to
contain p. Whereas EM[F2;M] is handled directly, the
reconstruction of EM[FM] requires us to step through
the functions T and A according to the following
scheme:
b F2;i(p)  EM[F2;M](p) = A(F(p))
() A 1(b F2;i(p))  F(p)
() T(A 1(b F2;i(p)))  T(F(p)) = EM[FM](p) :
Namely, in stage i we sample EM[F2;M] to obtain the
empirical distribution b F2;i, and then estimate EM[FM]
in (3.5) through T(A 1(b F2;i())).
In order to emphasize that the role played by the
composite function A(T 1()) here is the very same as
the function () in Section 2, we overload the notation
and dene in this section (x) = A(T 1(x)), where T
and A are given in Lemma 3.1. Moreover, we dene for
brevity  F2(x) = EM[F2;M](x).
With this notation in hand, the detailed descrip-
tion of the algorithm becomes very similar to the one in
Section 2.2. Hence, in what follows we only emphasize
the dierences, which are essentially due to the modi-
ed condence interval delivered by Lemma 3.1, as com-
pared to Lemma 2.1.
In particular, if we rely on (3.6), the new condence
interval size for Stage i depends on the empirical distri-
bution b F2;i through the quantity (we again overload the
notation)
C;i(p) =
pE[M]
1   b F2;i(p)  
q
1
2Ti ln 6S

r
2
Ti
ln
6S

;
with
Ti >
1
2(1   b F2;i(p))2 ln
6S

:
Similarly, if we rely on (3.8), we have instead
C;i(p) =
p
1   b F2;i(p)
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

:The resulting pseudocode is the same as in Algorithm 1,
where the observations Rt(b pi) therein have to be inter-
preted as distributed i.i.d. as RM(b pi), and E[B(2)] and
F2 in b i are replaced by their M-average counterparts
EME

B
(2)
M

and  F2. We call the resulting algorithm the
Generalized Algorithm 1.
As for the analysis, Lemma 2.2 is replaced by
the following (because of notation overloading, the
statement is the same as that of Lemma 2.2, but the
involved quantities are dierent, and so is the proof in
the appendix).
Lemma 3.2. With the notation introduced at the begin-
ning of this section, if S = S(T) is the total number of
stages, we have that, for any xed stage i,
1   b F2;i(p) 
(p)2
6
 
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

holds with probability at least 1 =(3S), conditioned on
all past stages, uniformly over p 2 [b pi;1].
Then an easy adaptation of Lemma 2.3 leads to the
following regret bound. The proof is very similar to the
proof of Theorem 2.1, and is therefore omitted.
Theorem 3.1. With the notation introduced at the be-
ginning of this section, for any pair of distributions F
and Q such that (p) > 0 we have that the Generalized
Algorithm 1 operating on any time horizon T satisfying
T >
1
(p)8

288ln
6(1 + log2 log2 T)

2
with stage lengths Ti = T1 2
 i
for i = 1;2;:::, and
approximation parameter   (p)2=12 has regret
A
(p)2  O
p
T(logloglogT + log1=)(loglogT)

=
A
(p)2  ~ O
p
T log1=

with probability at least 1   , where A = E[M] if (3.6)
holds and A = 1 if (3.8) holds.
4 Conclusions and discussion.
Optimizing the reserve price in a second-price auction
is an important theoretical and practical concern. We
introduced a regret minimization algorithm to optimize
the reserve price incurring a regret of only e O(
p
T). We
showed the result both for the case where the number
of bidders is known, and for the case where the number
of bidders is drawn from a known distribution. The
former assumption, of known xed number of bidders,
is applicable when the number of bidders is given as
the outcome of the auction. The assumption that the
distribution over the number of bidders is known is
rather realistic, even in the case where the number
of participating bidders is not given explicitly. For
example, one can hope to estimate such data from
historical data that might be made available from the
auctioneer.
Our optimization of the reserve prices depends only
on observable outcomes of the auction. Specically, we
need only observe the seller's actual revenue at each
step. This is important in many applications, such
as e-Bay, AdX or AdSense, where the auctioneer is
a dierent entity from the seller, and provides to the
seller only limited amount of information regarding the
actual auction. It is also important that we make no
assumptions about the distribution of the bidder's bid
(or its relationship to the bidder's valuation) since many
of those assumptions are violated in reality. The only
assumption that we do make is that the distributions
of the bidders are identical. This assumption is a fairly
good approximation of reality in many cases where the
seller conducts a large number of auctions and bidders
rarely participate in a large number of them.
The resulting algorithm is very simple at a high
level, and potentially attractive to implement in prac-
tice. Conceptually, we would like to estimate the opti-
mal reserve price. The main issue is that if we simply
exploit the current best estimate, we might miss essen-
tial exploration. This is why, instead of playing the
current best estimate, the algorithm plays a minimal -
optimal reserve price, where  shrinks over time. The
importance of playing the minimal near-optimal reserve
price is that it allows for ecient exploration of the
prices, due to the specic feedback model provided by
the second-price auction setting.
We are currently working on extending our results
to the generalized second price auction model, when
multiple items of dierent quality are sold at each
step. Here the problem of estimating the expected
revenue function becomes more involved due to the
presence of terms that depend on the correlation of
order statistics. We are also trying to see whether
the inverse dependence on (p) in Theorem 2.1 (and
on (p)2 in Theorem 3.1) can somehow be removed.
Indeed, these factors do not seem to be inherent to the
problem itself, but only to the kind of algorithms we
use.
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A Proofs.
Proof of Fact 2.1: By denition of R(p) we can write
(A.1) (p) =
Z 1
p
xdF2(x) + pP
 
B(2) < p  B(1)
:
By applying the identity E[X] =
R
P(X > x)dx to the
nonnegative r.v. B(2) IfB(2)>pg we obtain
Z 1
p
xdF2(x) = p
 
1   F2(p)

+
Z 1
p
 
1   F2(x)

dx
= p   pF2(p) + E

B(2)
 
Z p
0
 
1   F2(x)

dx
= E

B(2)
  pF2(p) +
Z p
0
F2(t)dt :
Moreover,
F2(p) = m(F(p))m 1  
1   F(p)

+ (F(p))m
and
P
 
B(2) < p  B(1)
= m
 
1   F(p)

(F(p))m 1 :
Substituting the above into (A.1) and simplifying
concludes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2.1: A simple derivative argument
shows that the function () is a strictly increasing and
concave mapping from [0;1] onto [0;1]. Hence its inverse
 1() exists and is strictly increasing and convex on
[0;1]. From our assumptions we immediately have:
(i) x   1(a + ) for any  2 [0;1   a], and (ii)
 1(a   )  x for any  2 [0;a]. In turn, because
of the convexity of  1(), we have
(A.2)
 1(a + )   1(a) +
1    1(a)
1   a
; 8 2 [0;1   a] :
Similarly, by the convexity and the monotonicity of
 1() we can write
 1(a   )   1(a)  
d 1(x)
dx

 
x=a

  1(a)  
1    1(a)
1   a
; 8 2 [0;a] : (A.3)We need the following technical claim.
Claim 1.
1    1(a)  2
p
1   a; 8a 2 [0;1] :
Proof of Claim: Introduce the auxiliary function
f(a) = 1   2
p
1   a. The claim is proven by showing
that (f(a))  a for all a 2 [3=4;1]. Note that the
case a 2 [0;3=4) is trivially veried. We prove the claim
by showing that (f(a)) is a concave function of a 2
[3=4;1], and that
d(f(a))
da
 
a=1  1, while (f(1)) = 1.
We have
d(f(a))
da
=  2(m   1)
1   (f(a)) 1=m
1   f(a)
:
Hence, using L'Hopital's rule,
d(f(a))
da


a=1 =
2(m   1)
m
 1
since m  2. Moreover,
d2(f(a))
da2 =  

m   1
m

(f(a)) 
m+1
m 
1
1   a
+
m   1
2

(f(a)) 1=m   1
(1   a)3=2
which is nonpositive if and only if m((f(a)) 1=m  1) 
(1   f(a))(f(a)) 
m+1
m holds for any a 2 [3=4;1]. Since
f(a) ranges in [0;1] when a 2 [3=4;1], after some
simplications, one can see that the above inequality
is equivalent to
(m + 1)x  mx
m+1
m + 1; 8x 2 [0;1] :
In turn, this inequality can be seen to hold by showing
via a simple derivative argument that the function
g(x) = mx
m+1
m + 1 is convex and increasing for
x 2 [0;1], while g(0) = 1 > 0 and g0(1) = m + 1. 
The claim together with (A.2) and (A.3) allows us to
conclude the proof of Lemma 2.1. Specically, the
second inequality in (2.2) is obtained by (A.2) and
extended to any   0 just by observing that, by the
claim, for  > 1   a the right-most side of (2.2) is
larger than 1. Moreover, the rst inequality in (2.2)
is obtained by (A.3) and extended to any   0 by
observing that for  > a the left-most side of (2.2) is
smaller than  1(a)   2a p
1 a  a   2a p
1 a  0 for any
a 2 [0;1], where we have used the fact that  1(a)  a.

Proof of Lemma 2.2: Let B
(1)
k and B
(2)
k denote
the maximum and the second-maximum of k i.i.d. bids
B1;:::;Bk. Set for brevity A = P
 
B
(1)
m > p

. Then we
have
A  2P
 
B
(1)
dm=2e > p

and
A  2P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p

+ P
 
B1 > p

 3P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p

:
Hence
1   F2(p) = P
 
B(2)
m > p

 P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p

 P
 
B
(1)
dm=2e > p


A
3

A
2
:
In turn, A  (p), since each time all the bids are less
than p the revenue is zero. Therefore we have obtained
that
1   F2(p) 
2(p)
6
holds for all p 2 [0;1]. Finally, since b F2;i is the
empirical version of F2 based on the observed revenues
during stage i (see Section 2.3), the classical Dvoretzky-
Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality [13] implies that
with probability at least 1   =3S, conditioned on all
past stages,
max
p2[b pi;1]

b F2;i(p)   F2(p)

 
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

:

Proof of Lemma 2.3: We start by proving (2.3). Fix
any stage i and write

(p)   b i(p)

 


 
Z p
0
F2(t)dt  
Z p
0
b F2;i(t)dt


 
+ p

 (F(p))m    1 b F2;i(p)

 

Z p
0
 F2(t)   b F2;i(t)
 dt
+ p


(F(p))m    1 b F2;i(p)



 p max
t2[0;p]
 F2(t)   b F2;i(t)
  (A.4)
+ p


(F(p))m    1 b F2;i(p)


 :
The DKW inequality implies that
(A.5)
p max
t2[0;p]
 F2(t)   b F2;i(t)
   p
r
1
2Ti
ln
6S

 C;i(p)
holds with probability at least 1 =(3S). As for the sec-
ond term in (A.4) we apply again the DKW inequalityin combination with Lemma 2.1 with x = (F(p))m =
 1 
F2(p)

, a = b F2;i(p), and  =
q
1
2Ti ln 6S
 . This
yields
p
 
 1 
F2(p)

   1 b F2;i(p)
 
  C;i(p)
with the same probability of at least 1 =(3S). Putting
together and using the union bound over the S stages
gives (2.3).
We prove (2.4) by induction on i = 1;:::;S. We
rst show that the base case i = 1 holds with probability
at least 1   =S. Then we show that if (2.4) holds for
i 1, then it holds for i with probability at least 1 =S
over all random events in stage i. Therefore, using a
union bound over i = 1;:::;S we get that (2.4) holds
simultaneously for all i with probability at least 1   .
For the base case i = 1 note that b 1(p)  b 1(b p
1)
holds with probability at least 1 =(3S) because we are
assuming (Lemma 2.2) that b F2(p)  1    holds with
the same probability, and so b p
1 maximizes b 1 over a
range that with probability at least 1 =(3S) contains
p. Moreover, using (2.3) we obtain
(p)   b 1(p)  2C;1(p)
and
b 1(b p
1)   (b p
1)  2C;1(b p
1) :
Since (b p
1)   (p)  0 by denition of p, we obtain
0  b 1(b p
1)   b 1(p)  2C;1(b p
1) + 2C;1(p)
as required. Finally, p  b p1 trivially holds because
b p1 = 0.
We now prove (2.4) for i > 1 using the inductive
assumption p  b pi 1 and
0  b i 1(b p
i 1) b i 1(p)  2C;i 1(b p
i 1)+2C;i 1(p) :
The inductive assumption and b F2;i(p)  1  directly
imply p 2 Pi
Tn
p : b F2;i 1(p)  1   
o
(recall the
denition of the set of candidate prices Pi given in Al-
gorithm 1). Thus we have p  b pi and b i(b p
i)  b i(p),
because b p
i maximizes b i over a range that contains p.
The rest of the proof closely follows that of (2.4) for
the base case i = 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1: If S = S(T) is the total
number of stages, then the regret of our algorithm is
 
(p)   (b p0)

T1 +
S X
i=2
 
(p)   (b pi)

Ti
 T1 +
S X
i=2
 
(p)   (b pi)

Ti : (A.6)
For all stages i > 1 the following chain on inequalities
jointly hold with probability at least 1    uniformly
over i = 2;:::;S,
(p)   (b pi)
 (p)   b i 1(b pi) + 2C;i 1(b pi)
(by (2.3) |note that b pi  b pi 1)
 (p)   b i 1
 
b p
i 1

+ 2C;i 1(b p
i 1) + 4C;i 1(b pi)
(since b pi 2 Pi)
 (p)   b i 1(p) + 2C;i 1(b p
i 1) + 4C;i 1(b pi)
(since b i 1(b p
i 1)  b i 1(p) |see (2.4))
 2C;i 1(p) + 2C;i 1(b p
i 1) + 4C;i 1(b pi)
(by p  b pi combined with (2.3))
 8
s
1
Ti 1
ln
6S

where in the last step we used the fact that b F2;i 1(p) 
1    holds by Lemma 2.2, and that b F2;i 1(p)  1   
for p = b pi and p = b p
i 1 by the very denitions of b pi
and b p
i 1, respectively. Substituting back into (A.6) we
see that with probability at least 1  the regret of our
algorithm is at most
T1 + 8
S X
i=2
Ti
s
1
Ti 1
ln
6S

:
Our setting Ti = T1 2
 i
for i = 1;2;::: implies that S
is upper bounded by the minimum integer n such that
n X
i=1
T1 2
 i
 T :
Since i  log2 log2 T makes Ti  T
2 , then S 
d2 log2 log2 Te = O(loglogT). Moreover, observe that
Ti = T1 2
 i
is equivalent to T1 =
p
T and Ti p
Ti 1
=
p
T,
for i > 1. We therefore have the upper bound
(A:6) 
p
T + 8
p
T S
r
1

ln
6S

:
If (p) > 0 and
min
i
Ti = T1 =
p
T 
72ln(6S=)
(p)4
then   (p)2=12, and the above is order of
p
T(logloglogT + log1=)(loglogT)
(p)
as claimed. Proof of Lemma 3.1: We start by observing that
T(0) = A(0) = 0, T(1) = A(1) = 1, T0(x)  0 for
x 2 [0;1] and A0(x) = (1   x)T00(x)  0 when x 2
[0;1]. Hence both T(x) and A(x) are strictly increasing
mappings from [0,1] onto [0,1], and so are T 1(x),
A 1(x) and A(T 1(x)). Hence our assumptions on x
can be rewritten as
T(A 1(a   ))  x  T(A 1(a + )) :
Moreover, since T() and A() are both C1(0;1), so is
T(A 1()). Let  < 1   a. We can write
T(A 1(a + )) = T(A 1(a)) + 
dT(A 1(x))
dx


 
x=
for some  2 (a;a + ), where
dT(A 1(x))
dx
=
T0(y)
A0(y)
=
T0(y)
(1   y)T00(y)
and we set for brevity y = A 1(x) 2 [0;1]. Now, for
any y 2 [0;1],
T0(y)
T00(y)

y
P
m2 mQ(m)ym 2
P
m2 m(m   1)Q(m)ym 2  y  1 :
As a consequence, since A 1 is a nondecreasing func-
tion, we can write
(A.7)
dT(A 1(x))
dx

 

x=

1
1   A 1(a + )

1
1   T 1(a + )
the last inequality deriving from8 A(x)  T(x) for all
x 2 [0;1]. Finally, from the convexity of T we have
T(x)  T(1) + (x   1)T0(1) = 1 + (x   1)E[M]. Thus
T 1(x)  1   1 x
E[M], x 2 [0;1], which we plug back into
(A.7) to see that
dT(A 1(x))
dx

 

x=

E[M]
1   (a + )
:
Replacing backwards, this yields the second inequality
of (3.6).
To prove the rst inequality of (3.6), we start o
showing it to hold for  < minfa;1 ag, and then extend
it to  < 1 a. Set  < a. Then proceeding as above we
8Whereas the function A() is, in general, neither convex nor
concave, T() is a convex lower bound on A().
can see that, for some  2 (a   ;a),
T(A 1(a)) = T(A 1(a   )) + 
dT(A 1(x))
dx

 

x=
 T(A 1(a   )) +

1   T 1(a)
 T(A 1(a   )) +
E[M]
1   a
 T(A 1(a   )) +
E[M]
1   (a + )
the last inequality requiring also  < 1   a. If now 
satises a   < 1 a (assuming a < 1=2) then the rst
inequality of (3.6) is trivially fullled. In fact,
T(A 1(a))  
E[M]
1   (a + )
 A(A 1(a))  
aE[M]
1   2a
= a

1  
E[M]
1   2a

< 0
since E[M]  2. This concludes the proof of (3.6).
In order to prove (3.8), we set for brevity y =
A 1(x), and using the rules of dierentiating inverse
functions, we see that
d2 T(A 1(x))
dx2 =
1
(1   y)2 T00(y)
+
T0(y)
(1   y)3 (T00(y))2
 
T0(y)T000(y)
(1   y)2 (T00(y))3 :
Thus d
2
dx2T(A 1(x))  0 for x 2 [0;1] is equivalent to
(T00(y))2 (1   y) + T0(y)T00(y)
 T0(y)T000(y)(1   y); 8x 2 [0;1]:
Since y ranges over [0,1] when x does, (3.7) is actually
equivalent to the convexity of T(A 1(x)) on x 2 [0;1].
Under the above convexity assumption, we can write,
for   1   a,
T(A 1(a + ))  T(A 1(a)) +
1   T(A 1(a))
1   a

 T(A 1(a)) +

1   a
:
On the other hand, if  > 1   a the above inequality
vacuously holds, since the right-hand side is larger than
one, while T(A 1(x))  1 for any x 2 [0;1]. This
proves the second inequality in (3.8). Similarly, by the
convexity and the monotonicity of T(A 1()) we canwrite, for all  2 [0;a],
T(A 1(a   ))  T(A 1(a))  
dT(A 1(x))
dx

 

x=a

 T(A 1(a))  
1   T(A 1(a))
1   a

 T(A 1(a))  

1   a
which gives the rst inequality in (3.8). We extend the
above to any   0 by simply observing that  > a
implies that T(A 1(a))   
1 a < a   a
1 a < 0, where
T(A 1(a))  a follows from the convexity of T(A 1()).
This makes (3.8) trivially fullled. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Let B
(1)
m and B
(2)
m denote
the highest and the second-highest of m i.i.d. bids
B1;:::;Bm. Recall from the proof of Lemma 2.2 that,
for any m  2
P
 
B
(1)
dm=2e > p


1
2
P
 
B(1)
m > p

and
P
 
B
(1)
bm=2c > p


1
3
P
 
B(1)
m > p

:
Moreover,
1   F2(p)
= EM
h
P
 
B
(2)
M > p
 M
i
 EM
h
P
 
B
(1)
bM=2c > p
 M

 P
 
B
(1)
dM=2e > p
 M
i

1
6
EM

P
 
B
(1)
M > p
 M
2

1
6

EM
h
P
 
B
(1)
M > p
 M
i2

1
6
2(p)
the second-last inequality being Jensen's, and the last
one deriving from IfB
(1)
m >pg  Rm(p) for all m  2 and
p 2 [0;1]. We then conclude as in the proof of Lemma
2.2 by applying DKW on the uniform convergence of
b F2;i to  F2. 
B Bounding the actual regret.
We show how to bound in probability the actual regret
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (p)  
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (pt)
suered by the Generalized Algorithm 1. We need the
following denitions and results from empirical process
theory |see, e.g., [19]. Let F be a set of [0;1]-valued
functions dened on a common domain X. We say that
F shatters a sequence x1;:::;xn 2 X if there exists
r1;:::;rn 2 R such that for each (a1;:::;an) 2 f0;1gn
there exists f 2 F for which f(xi)  ri i ai = 1
for all i = 1;:::;n. The pseudo-dimension [17] of F,
which is dened as the length of the longest sequence
shattered by F, controls the rate of uniform convergence
of means to expectations in F. This is established by
the following known lemma, which combines Dudley's
entropy bound with a bound on the metric entropy of
F in terms of the pseudo-dimension |see, e.g., [19, 18].
Lemma B.1. Let X1;X2;::: be i.i.d. random variables
dened on a common probability space and taking values
in X. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that,
for any xed T and ,
sup
f2F
 
 

T X
t=1
f(Xt)   TE[f]
 
 

 C
r
dT ln
1

with probability at least 1   , where d is the pseudo-
dimension of F.
Recall that EME

RM(p)

= (p) for all p 2 [0;1].
Let R =

RM(p) : p 2 [0;1]
	
be the class of revenue
functions indexed by reserve prices p 2 [0;1]. Hence, for
each p, RM(p) is a [0;1]-valued function of the number
M of bidders and the bids B1;:::;BM.
Lemma B.2. The pseudo-dimension of the class R is
2 .
Proof. [Proof sketch] Since the revenue RM(p) is de-
termined by B
(1)
M and B
(2)
M only, we use the notation
Rp(b1;b2) to denote the revenue RM(p) when B
(1)
M = b1
and B
(2)
M = b2. Since b1  b2, in order to com-
pute the pseudo-dimension of F we have to determine
the largest number of points shattered in the region
S = f(b1;b2) : 0  b2  b1  1g  R2 where the func-
tions Rp are dened as
Rp(b1;b2) =
8
<
:
0 if b1 < p
p if b2  p  b1
b2 if b2 > p.
Note that each function Rp denes an axis-parallel
rectangle with corners (p;p), (p;0), (1;p) and (1;0).
Inside the rectangle Rp = p, to the left of the rectangle
Rp = 0, and points (b1;b2) above it satisfy Rp(b1;b2) =
b2. It is easy to verify that F shatters any two points
(b1;b2) and (b1   ;b2 + ) in the region S: the pattern
(0;0) is achieved for a p such that both points are
inside the rectangle, the pattern (1;1) is achieved fora p such that both points are above the rectangle, and
the patterns (0;1) and (1;0) are achieved for values of
p that have either point inside the rectangle. It is now
easy to realize that no three points can be shattered
using rectangles of this form.
Theorem B.1. Under the assumptions of Theo-
rem 3.1, the actual regret of Generalized Algorithm 1
satises
max
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (p)  
T X
t=1
R
Mt
t (pt)
=
A
(p)2  e O
 r
T log
1

!
with probability at least 1   , where A = E[M] if (3.6)
holds and A = 1 if (3.8) holds.
Proof. For the sake of brevity, let Rt(p) denote R
Mt
t (p).
Also, let the conditional expectation Et[] denote
Et[jp1;:::;pt 1], i.e., the expectation of the random
variable at argument w.r.t. M and the bids B1;:::;BM,
conditioned on all past bids and number of bidders. Let
p
T be the random variable dened as
p
T = argmax
p2[0;1]
T X
t=1
Rt(p) :
Then
T X
t=1
Rt(p
T)  
T X
t=1
Rt(pt)
=
T X
t=1
Rt(p
T)   T(p
T)
+ T(p
T)  
T X
t=1
Rt(pt)
+
T X
t=1
Et

Rt(pt)

 
T X
t=1
Et

Rt(pt)

 max
p2[0;1]
 
T X
t=1
Rt(p)   T(p)
!
(B.8)
+
T X
t=1

Et

Rt(pt)

  Rt(pt)

(B.9)
+ T(p
T)  
T X
t=1
Et

Rt(pt)

: (B.10)
In order to bound (B.8) we combine Lemma B.1 with
Lemma B.2. This gives
max
p2[0;1]
 
T X
t=1
Rt(p)   T(p)
!
 C
r
2T ln
1

with probability at least 1   , where C is the constant
mentioned in Lemma B.1.
In order to bound (B.9), note that Zt =
Et

Rt(pt)

  Rt(pt) for t = 1;2;::: is a martingale dif-
ference sequence with bounded increments, Et[Zt] = 0
with Zt 2 [ 1;1] for each t. Therefore, the Hoeding-
Azuma inequality for martingales establishes that
T X
t=1

Et

Rt(pt)

  Rt(pt)


r
2T ln
1

with probability at least 1   .
Finally, term (B.10) is bounded via Theorem 3.1
after observing that (p
T)  (p), where p =
argmaxp2[0;1] (p) is the maximizer of the expected
revenue. This concludes the proof.